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An object-based video authentication system, which combines watermarking, error correction coding (ECC), and digital signature
techniques, is presented for protecting the authenticity between video objects and their associated backgrounds. In this system, a
set of angular radial transformation (ART) coeﬃcients is selected as the feature to represent the video object and the background,
respectively. ECC and cryptographic hashing are applied to those selected coeﬃcients to generate the robust authentication wa-
termark. This content-based, semifragile watermark is then embedded into the objects frame by frame before MPEG4 coding.
In watermark embedding and extraction, groups of discrete Fourier transform (DFT) coeﬃcients are randomly selected, and
their energy relationships are employed to hide and extract the watermark. The experimental results demonstrate that our system
is robust to MPEG4 compression, object segmentation errors, and some common object-based video processing such as object
translation, rotation, and scaling while securely preventing malicious object modifications. The proposed solution can be further
incorporated into public key infrastructure (PKI).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the object-based MPEG4 standard is becoming
growingly attractive to various applications in areas such as
the Internet, video editing, and wireless communication be-
cause of its object-based nature. For instance, in video edit-
ing, it is the object of interest, not the whole video, which
needs to be processed; in video transmission, if the band-
width of the channel is limited, only the objects, not the
background, are transmitted in real time. Generally speak-
ing, object-based video processing can simplify video edit-
ing, reduce bit rate in transmission, and make video search
eﬃcient. Such flexibilities, however, also pose new challenges
tomultimedia security (e.g., content authenticity protection)
because the video object (VO) can be easily accessed, mod-
ified, or even replaced by another VO in object-based video
application.
Consider a video surveillance system, shown in Figure 1.
The captured video is sent to processing centers or end users
via various channels. This video could even be further pro-
cessed to serve as a legal testimony in the court in some
surveillance applications such as automatic teller machine
(ATM) monitoring system. In order to save the transmission
and storage cost, only those video clips containing interest-
ing objects are required to be sent and stored. Moreover, if
the background changes very slowly, which is common in
surveillance applications, a possible eﬃcient solution is that
only the objects are sent out frame by frame in real time while
the background is sent once in a long time interval. In such
application scenarios, it becomes very important to protect
authenticity of the video, which involves two parts of the
work: one is to protect the integrity of the object/background
(i.e., any modifications on the video which result in the al-
teration of video meaning are not allowed), the other is to
protect the identity of the transmission source (i.e., identify
the video source). Although digital signature scheme is an
ideal solution to protect the authenticity of the received data
[1], it does not provide any robustness. The objective of this
















Figure 1: An example of video surveillance system. Only video clips containing interesting objects will be transmitted and authenticated;
and the video frames are segmented into foreground (object) and background for individual transmission. So an object-based video authen-
tication system is required.
paper is to propose a secure, robust, and object-based video
authentication solution.
The requirements for an object-based video authentica-
tion system are diﬀerent from those for a frame-based video
authentication system; and these requirements are usually
application dependent. As we know, it is very easy for the
VO and background to be modified or even maliciously re-
placed by another object by the attacker during video trans-
mission or storage. Hence, for security reasons, such kinds of
attacks should be alerted and detected. (We define the dis-
tortions introduced by attacks as intentional distortions.) On
the other hand, as shown in Figure 1, the video will usually
be segmented into objects and background first, and the ob-
jects and background are then compressed individually be-
fore transmission; at the receiving site, the decompressed ob-
jects may even be scaled, translated, or rotated to interact
with the end users. For robustness reasons, such kinds of
video processing should be allowed. (We define the distor-
tions introduced by above-mentioned object/video process-
ing as incidental distortions.) Therefore, a practical object-
based video authentication system should be robust to in-
cidental distortions while being sensitive to intentional dis-
tortions for specific video applications.
Bartolini et al. [2] proposed a frame-based video authen-
tication system for surveillance application. In their system,
the camera ID, together with time and date, is used to gen-
erate the watermark. This watermark is then embedded into
the raw video at the camera site. The watermarked video is
sent to the central unit at the sending site. The central unit
monitors and analyzes the video, and generates an alarm if
necessary. The alarm, is transmitted with the video sequences
causing this alarm to an intervention center via various chan-
nels. This watermarked video sequence can be used as a tes-
timony in the court. They claimed that this system is robust
to video compression with capability to detect tampering at-
tack if the tampered region is not too small. However, their
system is not suitable for object-based video authentication
since the authentication level is at frame. Furthermore, the
symmetric watermarking techniques used in this systemmay
cause some security problems.
In an object-based video authentication system, every
object in the video should be processed, signed, and au-
thenticated separately. Several such algorithms have been
proposed. MPEG4 Intellectual Property Rights by Adduc-
ing and Ordering (MIRADOR) project1 was developed for
copyright protection under the MPEG4 framework by in-
tegrating MPEG2 watermarking technologies into MPEG4.
In this project, each object in the video is watermarked us-
ing a diﬀerent value (identifier) and key in order to protect
the copyright of the video sequence. If the illegal user ex-
ploits the object of interest in the video to create his own
work, the content provider can detect such illegal usage.
Piva et al. [3] also proposed a similar approach, where the
raw video frame is segmented into foreground and back-
ground, denoted by VO0 (video object 0) and VO1, respec-
tively; each VO is embedded with a diﬀerent watermark in
wavelet transform domain. These two works, however, only
focus on the development of object-based watermarking al-
gorithm.
Some other previous works on content-based water-
marking/authentication are listed as follows. Lin and Chang
[4] used the relationship between the DCT coeﬃcients at the
same position in diﬀerent blocks of an image as the feature
to generate the watermark. This feature is robust to multi-
cycle JPEG compression, but it is not robust to image scal-
ing or image rotation because the relationship between the
DCT coeﬃcients cannot be kept constant when image is
scaled or rotated. Dittmann et al. [5] and Queluz [6] used
the edge/corner of the image as the feature to generate a dig-
ital signature for authentication. Although this signature is
robust to most video processing, its size is too large to cre-
ate a content-based watermark; and the consistency of the
edges/corners themselves under incidental distortions is also
a problem.
To ensure that the authentication system is robust to in-
cidental distortions, besides creating a robust content-based
1http://www.cordis.lu/infowin/acts/analysys/products/thematic/mpeg4/
mirador/mirador.htm.


















































Figure 2: Block diagram of the proposed system. The block diagram is divided into two parts by the dashed line AB: on the left side is the
procedure for signing, and on the right side is the procedure for video authenticity verification.
watermark, the watermarking algorithm should be able to
protect the embedded watermark from such distortions.
Many works have been done at object level. Boulgouris et
al. [7], Lu and Liao [8], and Lie et al. [9] chose to em-
bed the watermark in the DCT domain. But these algo-
rithms are not robust to segmentation error since water-
marked DCT blocks on the mask boundary are very sensi-
tive to mask or segmentation error. To solve this problem,
Bas and Macq [10] and Piva et al. [3] chose to embed a wa-
termark in the spatial domain, and wavelet domain respec-
tively.
In this paper, we propose a complete object-based video
authentication system to protect the authenticity of video
content, as shown in Figure 2. The procedures of watermark
generation and video authentication are given in Figures 3
and 4. The feature of the object is error correction coding
(ECC) encoded first; the resultant codeword, together with
the feature of the background, is then hashed (e.g., MD5 or
SHA-1 [11]) to get a short content-based message so that a
secure link between the object and the background is created
to protect the integrity of the video. The system’s robustness
to various video processing is guaranteed by ECC and wa-
termarking; and the system’s security is protected by cryp-
tographic hashing which is a basic algorithm used to gener-
ate message authentication code (MAC [1]). We will explain
these in Sections 2 and 3 in detail. It is worth mentioning
here that this content-based message can also be signed by
the system’s private key to generate a digital signature (the
part marked by the dotted lines in Figure 3) and therefore
it can be easily incorporated into public key infrastructure
(PKI).
The proposed system is the continuation of our previous
works [12, 13]. The paper is organized as follows: the frame-
work of the proposed system will be introduced in Section 2;
the content-based watermark generation and verification are
illustrated in Section 3; watermark embedding and extrac-
tion algorithm will be explained in Section 4; experimen-
tal results will be given in Section 5; conclusion and future
works are presented in Section 6.
2. OVERVIEWOF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
As we have described in the introduction section, the pro-
posed system is designed to be robust to incidental distor-
tions introduced by acceptable video processing. So we will
define the acceptable video processing before briefing on
the proposed system, because only after the acceptable video
processing is defined, can we evaluate the robustness and se-
curity of the system.
2.1. Targeted acceptable video processing
Resizing (scaling)
The resources of end users may vary significantly. For exam-
ple, monitors of some devices may not be able to display the
video in its original resolution. So the received video has to
be scaled to meet such limitation. As a result, the designed
video authentication system must be robust to resizing (scal-
ing) processing. In real application such as video transcod-
ing, resolution is halved when the video is converted from
CIF format to QCIF format. Since the information of the ob-
ject is mostly preserved when the scaling factor exceeds 1, it is
easier to design a robust video authentication system under
this condition compared with the case when the scaling fac-
tor is less than 1. Thus, we will assume that the scaling factor
is in a range from 0.5 to 1 in this system.
Rotation/translation
In video editing, the VO may be translated and/or rotated
to meet end user’s specific requirement. Because the video
content remains unchanged after the object is rotated and/or
translated, the proposed system should be robust to object
rotation in any degree and object translation in any style.
Segmentation error
As we discussed in the introduction, the video is segmented
into object and background for watermarking individually.
Thus, segmentation may be required during video authenti-
cation. Again, we use ATM monitoring application as an ex-
ample. Normally, the object and background are combined




























Figure 3: Procedure of watermark generation. The inputs are video object and background; and the output is a content-based watermark.






































Figure 4: Procedure of video authentication. The inputs are video object and background; the output is the authenticity of video.
into a “raw video” for display and storage regardless of its
authenticity at the receiving site. Only when necessary, such
as the incidence of an illegal withdrawal of cash from an
ATM machine, will the end users, bank in this case, check
the video authenticity. So the video has to be segmented
again before authentication can proceed. A segmentation er-
ror between the object at the sending site and the reseg-
mented object at the receiving site may exist. Therefore, the
proposed system should be robust to slight segmentation er-
rors.
MPEG4 coding
The VO and background are usually compressed before they
are transmitted. The proposed system should, hence, be ro-
bust to such kind of coding if the quality of video after com-
pression is still satisfactory. In MPEG4 coding, two processes
will aﬀect the robustness of the video authentication system.
One is the requantization process that is common in most
coding schemes; the other is the repadding process that is
unique for MPEG4 coding. In our system, we use bit rate to
measure the requantization step.




Translation Any direction and extent
Resizing Scaling factor: 0.5–1.0
Requantization (MPEG4 coding) Bit rate (512Kbps)
Segmentation error Edge error
Repadding (MPEG4 coding) Zero padding
We summarize the typical acceptable video processing in
Table 1. The parameters for evaluating the system are also
listed here. (More details on experiments will be given in
Section 5.)
2.2. System brief description
In the introduction, we have mentioned that only the video
clips containing interesting objects are required to be trans-
mitted or stored to save the transmission cost or storage
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cost. So it is reasonable that we only protect the integrity
of the video clips that contain interesting objects. How to
define an interesting object is application dependent and
usually very diﬃcult. Fortunately, in surveillance applica-
tions, we have observed that the interesting objects, such as
a person in an ATM monitoring system, are usually quite
large. Thus, the size of the object is selected as a trigger to
start signing and verification in the proposed system (re-
fer to Figure 1). One video sequence may include many
objects, and the objects themselves may overlap in some
video frames. We will leave this case for future study. In this
proposed system, we only focus on video sequence where
every video frame contains one or more nonoverlap ob-
jects.
Figure 2 is the block diagram of the proposed system. It
comprises two parts: signing and verification. The procedure
for signing is on the left side, and the procedure for verifica-
tion is on the right side.
In the signing procedure, the input could be in either
raw video format (segmentation is needed in this case) or
object/background MPEG4 compliant format while the out-
puts are signed MPEG4 bitstreams. Firstly, features of the
object and its associated background are selected. Details of
feature selection will be described later. Secondly, a content-
based watermark is created based on the selected features, as
shown in Figure 3. The selected feature of the object is ECC
encoded first to ensure that the same feature can be obtained
in the verification procedure in spite of the incidental dis-
tortion. For the reason of system security, the ECC code-
word and the feature of the background are cryptographi-
cally hashed (e.g., MD5 or SHA-1) to get a content-based di-
gest, which will be used to authenticate the video during ver-
ification. A content-based message is created based on this
digest and parity check bit (PCB) data of the codeword. In
practice, another ECC scheme, such as convolutional coding
[14], is employed to increase the robustness of watermark to
the incidental distortions. Following the similar procedure,
the watermark for the background can also be created. For
simplicity, we will only focus on the object processing (ob-
ject feature selection, object watermark generation, and ob-
ject watermark embedding and extraction) in this paper. The
watermarks are embedded in the DFT domain of the ob-
ject/background. Details will be given in Section 4. Finally,
the watermarked object and background are compressed into
MPEG4 bitstreams. Note that if we want to generate a dig-
ital signature for the video, what we need to do is to use
the system’s private key to sign on the hashed digest by the
well-known digital signature scheme such as DSA or RSA
[1].
To authenticate the received video, the MPEG4 bit-
streams have to be decompressed to get the VO and back-
ground again. (In certain applications, if the inputs are al-
ready separated, object and background, this step can be
skipped. If the input is a video sequence including object and
background, segmentation should be employed first.) Fol-
lowing the same way as signing, features of the object and
background can be obtained. Note that the features are com-
puted from the received object and background. Meanwhile,
watermark is extracted from the received object. Authentic-
ity decision comprises two steps. In the first step, the PCB
data contained in the watermark and the feature obtained
from the received object are concatenated to form a feature
codeword; the syndrome of the codeword is calculated to see
whether it is correctable. If not, we claim that the video is
unauthentic. If yes, we turn to the second step. The authen-
ticity of the video is decided by bit-by-bit comparison be-
tween the two hashed digests. (One is the newly generated
based on hashing ECC codeword and the other is extracted
from the watermark.) Even if there is only one-bit diﬀerence
between them, we claim that the authenticity of the video has
been broken. More detailed description will also be given in
Section 3.
From the above description, we can find that feature se-
lection; watermark generation and authenticity verification;
and watermark embedding and extraction are the three im-
portant parts of our proposed object-based video authenti-
cation system. In addition, a good segmentation tool is also
very important for a successful authentication system. But it
is beyond the scope of this paper.
3. WATERMARK GENERATION AND
AUTHENTICITY VERIFICATION
Before discussing the watermark generation and authenticity
verification, we will discuss feature selection.
3.1. Feature selection
The feature selected to create a watermark in our proposed
video authentication system should have the following three
properties: robustness, discriminability/sensitivity, and short
length.
Robustness
The feature should have little or even no change if the
video only undergoes acceptable video processing defined in
Section 2.
Discriminability
The feature should be able to represent the specific VO. Fea-
tures obtained from diﬀerent objects should be diﬀerent.
Short length
Because of the issue of watermark capacity, the feature size
should be small.
Based on these criteria, angular radial transformation
(ART) is selected as the feature of the VO in our solution.
ART, which belongs to the broad class of shape analysis tech-
niques based onmoments, is one of the three visual shape de-
scriptors, which are employed to represent the image object
in MPEG7 [15, 16]. Studies show that ART has the follow-
ing specific properties: firstly, it gives a compact and eﬃcient
way to describe the object; secondly, the descriptor is robust
to segmentation errors and invariant to object rotation and
shape distortions.
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Figure 5: 36 normalized ART coeﬃcients calculated from the first
frame of video Akiyo. Usually high-order coeﬃcients have smaller
magnitudes.
The definition of ART is given in equation (1). Fnm is an
ART coeﬃcient of order n and m; Vnm(ρ, θ) is the ART basic
function that is separable along the angular and radial di-
rection; and f (ρ, θ) is a gray image in polar coordinates. In
MPEG7, f (ρ, θ) represents mask function. Here, we modify
this ART definition to make sure that the ART coeﬃcients
are sensitive to some intentional attacks, in which only the
content of the object is modified while the shape of the ob-
ject remains unchanged. This modification on ART defini-
tion, however, may bring an impact: the robustness of high-
order ART coeﬃcients may be aﬀected by the interpolation
error during rotation and scaling. Later, we will see how this
impact could be overcome:
Fnm =
〈







V∗nm(ρ, θ), f (ρ, θ)ρ dρ dθ,
(1)
and
Vnm(ρ, θ) = Am(θ)Rn(ρ),
Am(θ) = 12π exp( jmθ),
Rn(ρ) =

1, n = 0,2 cos(πnρ), n = 0.
(2)
Figure 5 shows the 36 normalized ART coeﬃcients of the
first frame of video sequence “Akiyo,” shown in Figure 6a. In
MPEG7 specification, 35 ART coeﬃcients (excluding the first
coeﬃcient) are recommended to be used, and each coeﬃ-
cient is quantized to 4 bits/coeﬃcient. Hence, a region-based
shape descriptor is a 140-bit data. But in our video authen-
tication system, 140 bits is still too long to generate a water-
mark. Fortunately, from the following discussion, we will see
that not all these 35 ART coeﬃcients are necessary to be se-
lected and not every coeﬃcient is necessary to be quantized
to 4 bits.
As we have mentioned above, the feature of the VO for
generating a watermark should be robust and well discrim-
inable. Among the ART coeﬃcients, the low-order coeﬃ-
cients, which are also considered as low-order moments, rep-
resent the basic information of the VO while the high-order
coeﬃcients, which are also considered as high-order mo-
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6: Video sequences for feature vector evaluation. (a) Akiyo,
(b) Attacked Akiyo 1, and (d) Bream are CIF videos. (c) Weather is
QCIF video. The shapes of (a) and (b) are identical.
ments, represent the detailed information of the VO. So, the
low-order coeﬃcients should be part of the selected feature.
The selection of high-order coeﬃcients should consider both
the robustness and the discriminability. For high discrim-
inability, these coeﬃcients, which represent the detailed in-
formation, must be kept. But for robustness, these coeﬃ-
cients, which may change due to loss of high-frequency in-
formation and interpolation error when object is scaled or
rotated, should be discarded. It is a trade-oﬀ. The dissimi-
larity measure equation [15], which is used to measure the






where d and q represent diﬀerent images, andM is the array
of normalized magnitude of ART coeﬃcients.
This equation clearly indicates that the coeﬃcients with
smaller magnitudes have less contribution to object recogni-
tion. So, discarding these coeﬃcients will not aﬀect the rep-
resentation of the object significantly. Since high-order co-
eﬃcients usually have smaller magnitudes, in the proposed
system, we scan the 36 ART coeﬃcients in zigzag format, and
select the first 18 ART coeﬃcients as the feature of the ob-
ject. This information is known to both sending and receiv-
ing sites once the decision has been made. We will explain
why we select the first 18 ART coeﬃcients as the feature of
the object later in this section.
In our proposed system, those coeﬃcients with large
magnitudes will be quantized into 5 levels while those with
smaller magnitudes will be quantized into 3 levels to further
shorten the length of feature. Moreover, the quantized value
of each ART coeﬃcient is converted into a quasigray binary
code according to Tables 2 and 3. Finally, a feature vector
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Table 2: Two-bit quantization.
Level 0 1 2
Code 00 01 11
(FV) is created to represent a VO by concatenating the binary
codes. The quasigray code conversion is to ensure that one-
bit change of FV only represents one unit modification on the
feature of video content so that the diﬀerence between two
objects can be easily measured by just calculating the Ham-
ming distance between their two corresponding FVs. Hence,
equation (3) can be rewritten as equation (4)
Dissimilarity = ∥∥FVd − FVq ∥∥, (4)
where d and q represent two diﬀerent VO.
Now, we start to explain why the first 18 ART coeﬃcients
are selected as the feature of VO based on feature selection
criteria. The empirical way to select the ART coeﬃcients will
be given first. Experimental results will then be given to prove
that such a selection is correct.
The empirical way to filter the ART coeﬃcients is as fol-
lows.
(a) Scan the 36 ART coeﬃcients in zigzag format.
(b) As we have mentioned previously, low-order ART co-
eﬃcients should be part of our selected feature. We
make a reasonable assumption that the first 9 ART co-
eﬃcients are classified as low-order coeﬃcients, and
hence must be part of the selected feature. So we only
consider the ART coeﬃcients from 10 onwards. For a
specified Ni (10 ≤ Ni ≤ 35), the first Ni ART coeﬃ-
cients are used to create an FV. Then, the maximum
Hamming distance between the FV extracted from the
original object and the FV extracted from the object
processed by all kinds of acceptable video processing
is computed. If this distance is small and robust for all
training video sequences, Ni will be considered as the
candidate of robustness group Gr , Gr = {Ni, . . . ,Nk}.
(c) For every member in the robustness group Gr , the
Hamming distance between FVs extracted from two
diﬀerent VOs is calculated. If this distance is much
larger than the maximum Hamming distance between
the original VO and the processed VO (i.e., 3), we can
say that this feature has good discriminability. All these
kinds of Ni are defined as a group Grs.
(d) The smallest number in the groupGrs is the number of
ART coeﬃcients that should be selected.
Four video sequences are used during the above-
mentioned filtering. They are CIF videos “Akiyo,” “Attacked
Akiyo 1,” “Bream,” and QCIF video “Weather.” Figure 6
shows the first frame of every video sequence. Among them,
the shape information of video Attacked Akiyo 1 is identical
to that of the video Akiyo. We give the experimental results
when the first 18 ART coeﬃcients are selected to create an FV.
Figure 7 shows the maximum Hamming distance be-
tween the FV extracted from the original object and that
Table 3: Four-bit quantization.
Level 0 1 2 3 4
Code 0000 0001 0011 0111 1111
from the object having undergone various video processing.
The video processing includes scaling (scaling factor is in a
range from 0.5 to 0.9), rotation (rotation degree is in a range
from 10◦ to 30◦) and MPEG4 compression, and “Cubic” in-
terpolation technique is employed during rotation and scal-
ing processing. From the results, we can find that the max-
imum Hamming distance is not greater than 3. So we can
claim that the selected feature is robust to object rotation,
object resizing, andMPEG4 compression. Figure 8 shows the
diﬀerence between the mask of original object and the mask
of processed object. From Figure 8c, we can see that this dif-
ference is similar to segmentation error. The maximum error
on the edge is about 4 pixels. Usually the maximum pixel er-
ror on the edge of segmented object is also around this num-
ber. We therefore simulate the segmentation error by using
the mask diﬀerence. Because the selected FV is robust to such
kind of mask diﬀerence, we claim that the selected feature is
robust to slight segmentation error.
Figure 9a shows the Hamming distance between the FV
extracted from Attacked Akiyo 1 and that from Akiyo. The
distance between the FV extracted from Bream and that from
Akiyo is given in Figure 9b. From both figures, we find that
the Hamming distance exceeds 10 in most frames. This is
much larger thanthe maximum Hamming distance between
the originalobject and the processed object. Hence, we con-
clude that the selected feature has good discriminability, be-
cause we can easily deduce whether the two objects are dis-
tinct objects or just modified duplicates of each other from
the FVs.
Above experimental results demonstrate that the FV cre-
ated from the first 18 ART coeﬃcients can meet the robust-
ness and discriminability requirements. So we will select the
first 18 ART coeﬃcients as the feature of the object in the
proposed video authentication system.
3.2. Watermark generation and
authenticity verification
The procedure for a content-based watermark generation is
shown in Figure 3. Firstly, a systematic ECC scheme [17] is
utilized to encode the FV of VO to obtain a feature codeword.
(We define this ECC scheme as feature ECC coding scheme.)
A systematic ECC schememeans that after ECC encoding, its
codeword can be separated into two parts: one is its original
message and the other is its PCB data. Secondly, the feature
codeword, together with FV of background, is hashed by a
typical hash function such as MD5 or SHA-1 to get a hashed
digest. By including the background FV into the object water-
mark, a secure link between the object and background has
been created. So this object is not allowed for another back-
ground. Thirdly, the hashed digests from two consecutive
frames are further processed (e.g., XORed) to create a secure
link between these two frames. This can prevent the order
2192 EURASIP Journal on Applied Signal Processing












































































Figure 7: (a) Akiyo, (b) Attacked Akiyo 1, and (c)Weather show the maximumHamming distance between the feature vector obtained from
the original object and that from the object undergoing various video processing including rotation, resizing, andMPEG4 coding. (d) Bream
(resizing only) shows the maximum Hamming distance between the original object and the scaled object. The horizontal axis represents the
frame number, and the vertical axis represents the Hamming distance. From these figures, we can find that all maximumHamming distances
are not bigger than 3.
of video frames from being changed. Fourthly, the first n-bit
data of the processed result and the PCB data of the feature
codeword are concatenated to create a content-based mes-
sage. Finally, this message is encoded again by another ECC
scheme (we define it as watermark ECC coding scheme) to
generate a content-based watermark. Figure 10 illustrates in-
termediate results during watermark generation. It is found
that the watermark is a convolutional code by encoding the
content-based message.
From the procedure of watermark generation, we can
find that authenticity of video is protected securely. The se-
curity of the video is achieved by hashing the ECC codeword.
Further processing of the hashed digests from two consecu-
tive frames also improves the security of the video. In this
system, only part of the hashed digest (30 bits) instead of all
the 128 bits is used to create the watermark because of the
limitation in watermarking capacity. Note that reducing
length of hashed digest may cause some security risks; how-
ever, it is still acceptable in real applications, because a strong
contextual property in video content also makes attacking
content diﬃcult. Clearly, our proposed object-based solution
can be easily incorporated into PKI by generating a digital
signature based on the hashed digest and a selected signature
scheme such as RSA or DSA [1].
The procedure for authenticating received VO is shown
in Figure 4. No original video is needed during authentica-
tion. Firstly, PCB data and the hashed digest are obtained
by ECC decoding the extracted watermark. (It is the reverse
process of watermark ECC coding in watermark generation.)
Secondly, FV of the received object is calculated, which may
be diﬀerent from the FV of the original object since the re-
ceived VO may have undergone various video processing;
PCB data is used to correct this diﬀerence. Thirdly, a hashed
digest for the received object can be calculated following
similar steps in watermark generation. Finally, this hashed
digest and the hashed digest obtained from the extracted
watermark are compared bit by bit to decide the authentic-
ity of the object: even if there is only one-bit diﬀerence, the
video will be claimed as unauthentic.
We roughly explain the feature ECC coding scheme and
the watermark ECC coding scheme employed in the pro-
posed system. Please refer to [18] for more details on em-
ploying ECC scheme.
Feature ECC coding
As we have discussed in Section 3.1, the diﬀerence between
FV obtained from the original object and that from the pro-
cessed object may exist. This Hamming distance, however,
A Secure and Robust Object-Based Video Authentication System 2193





















Figure 8: Mask diﬀerence (c) between the original object: mask (a) and the processed object mask (b). This diﬀerence is similar to the
segmentation error.









































Figure 9: The distance between feature vectors obtained from diﬀerent video objects (a) Akiyo and Attacked Akiyo and (b) Akiyo and
Bream.
is relatively small compared with the Hamming distance be-
tween FVs obtained from two diﬀerent VOs. So, the de-
sign of feature ECC coding scheme should follow such a
rule: it should be able to correct the diﬀerence between
FVs obtained from the original object and that from the
object that has undergone acceptable video processing; on
the other hand, it should not be possible for the diﬀer-
ence between FVs obtained from diﬀerent objects to be
corrected. For instance, the maximum Hamming distance
is 3 in Section 3.1, so the selected feature ECC coding
scheme must be able to correct 3 errors in the feature code-
word.
Watermark ECC coding
Since the received VO may undergo a series of acceptable
video processing, the extracted watermark is usually not
identical to the embedded watermark. But in our system, we
have to get the original message (i.e., the PCB data of the
feature codeword and hashed digest) from the extracted wa-
termark. This problem is solved by introducing the water-
mark ECC coding scheme. The design of watermark ECC
coding scheme should consider the error ratio between the
extracted watermark and the original watermark in order to
make sure that the original message can be recovered free of
errors.
4. WATERMARK EMBEDDING AND EXTRACTION
To design an object-based video authentication system that
is robust to various acceptable video processing, the water-
marking algorithm should also be robust to these forms of
video processing.
Fourier-Mellin transform is widely used in pattern recog-
nition because of its invariance to image rotation, scal-
ing, and translation. A watermarking algorithm based on
Fourier-Mellin transform is first suggested by O’Ruanaidh
and Pun [19]. Lin et al. [20] further proposed a rotation,
scale, and translation resilient watermarking scheme closely
related to the Fourier-Mellin transform. However, unbal-
anced sampling of DFT coeﬃcients, introduced by log-polar
mapping and inverse log-mapping in Fourier-Mellin trans-
form, may cause a loss of image quality. The computation ex-
pense and watermark capacity of Fourier-Mellin transform-
based watermarking algorithms still cannot meet the needs
in designing our object-based video authentication system.
This could be one of our future works.
In our system, we choose to embed the watermark in
DFT domain because of good properties of DFT in object
rotation and scaling. Before the detailed procedures of wa-
termark embedding and extraction are given, we will discuss
some specific solutions for keeping the watermark robust to
acceptable video processing.














Hashed digest PCB data (1)
1010101100 . . . 111000111
Feature vector PCB data (1) Feature codeword
Crypto-hashed digest
Message
WatermarkConvolutional code of message
44 bits
63 bits
30 bits 18 bits
162 bits
Figure 10: Illustration of watermark generation. The main procedure is on the left side, and the intermediate results are on the right side.
PCB data (1) is the PCB data of feature codeword.
4.1. Challenges and solutions for object-based
watermark embedding and extraction
Repadding
In order to perform DFT on VO, the VO has to be padded to
form a rectangular area (image) first since the shape of the
object is usually irregular. However, this padding will aﬀect
the robustness of watermarking because the watermark in-
formation will be not only in the object area but also in the
padding area after watermark embedding and inverse DFT
(IDFT). During MPEG4 encoding, most of this padding area
will not be encoded and transmitted so that some watermark
information may be lost. If the padding area is large, some
watermark bits will not be correctly extracted. To solve this
problem, the size of the padding area should be limited, and
the relationship between two DFT coeﬃcients instead of the
individual DFT coeﬃcient is used to embed the watermark.
Rotation
Lin et al. [20] also pointed out that the DFT of a rotated im-
age is not the rotated DFT of the original image due to the
rectilinear tiling, as shown in Figure 11. It indicates that if the
watermarked object is rotated, it has to be rotated back for
watermark extraction. However, such kind of rotation will
introduce interpolation error that aﬀects robustness of wa-
termarking. To overcome this problem, the relationship be-
tween two groups of DFT coeﬃcients, rather than the rela-
tionship between two DFT coeﬃcients, is used to embed the
watermark, as shown in Figure 12.
Rotation also causes the synchronization problem in wa-
termark embedding and extraction. We adopt the method
given in [8] to solve this problem. The eigenvectors of the ob-
ject are calculated first, and then the VO is adjusted to align
its maximum eigenvector with the x-axis in two-dimensional
space before watermark embedding and extraction. Ideally,
the alignment parameters (e.g., the rotation degree) used for
watermark embedding should be identical to those used for
watermark extraction. In practice, this assumption is not ap-
propriate. Many factors such as mask error caused by the ob-
ject manipulation will interfere in getting exactly the same
alignment parameters in watermark extraction. By using the
relationship between two groups of DFT coeﬃcients to em-
bed the watermark, such incurred distortion will be allevi-
ated.
Resizing (scaling)
In this paper, we only focus on the cases when the scaling
factor is less than 1. We will also assume this scaling factor
is known during watermark extraction. This assumption is
reasonable since we can get the resolution information about
the original object by analyzing the MPEG4 bitstream. So the
object can be scaled back to its original resolution before wa-
termark extraction.
Although the received object can be scaled back to its
original resolution before watermark extraction, the high-
frequency information will be lost. An approximate relation-
ship between the DFT coeﬃcients before and after the im-
age is scaled is given in equation (5). Fp(u, v) represents DFT
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Figure 11: Comparison between (a) DFT of the original Akiyo image and (b) DFT of the 20◦ rotated Akiyo image. The DC of the DFT is





Figure 12: DFT coeﬃcients grouping for watermarking. The
bottom-left corner points to the origin of DFT domain. Eight DFT
coeﬃcients in 4× 4 group are classified into two subgroups.
coeﬃcients of processed image while Fo(u, v) represents DFT
coeﬃcients of original image. α is scaling factor while D is
half of the image resolution:
Fp(u, v) ≈ Fo(u, v) |u, v| < αD. (5)
Figure 13 shows this phenomenon; that only the low-
frequency and middle-frequency DFT coeﬃcients have no
change or little change after the object is scaled. Equation (5)
also reminds us that scaling factor α should be closely exam-
ined before we select a frequency area to embed watermark.
For example, if the scaling factor is 0.5, watermark should be
embedded in an area where all frequencies in this area are less
than half of the maximum frequency. In addition, we have to
bear in mind that the modification on low-frequency coeﬃ-
cients will significantly degrade the image quality. Consider-
ing these two factors, a low-middle frequency area (texture-
filled part in Figure 14a) is selected to embed watermark in
our algorithm. Note that Solachidis and Pitas [21] and Barni
et al. [22] also have similar considerations in their proposed
algorithms. In comparison, we also show the area selected by
Barni et al. [22] to embed watermark in Figure 14b. Again,
the interpolation error introduced by scaling object will also
aﬀect the robustness of the watermarking algorithm. Such in-
curred distortion, however, will be alleviated by using the re-
lationship between two groups of DFT coeﬃcients to embed
watermark.
4.2. Watermark embedding
The embedding procedure comprises the following three
steps: pre-embedding, embedding, and postembedding.
Pre-embedding
(a) Adjust the object to align its mask’s maximum eigen-
vector with the x-axis in two-dimensional space.
(b) Expand the object into a rectangular image whose size
is predefined. The selection of image size should con-
sider the object size. Zero padding is used during ex-
pansion.
(c) Compute the DFT coeﬃcients; shift the DFT coeﬃ-
cients in order that the DC coeﬃcient locates in the
center of DFT domain.
(d) Randomly select groups of DFT coeﬃcients in the
low-middle frequency area (shown in Figure 14a). The
seed to generate the random number sequence is only
known to watermark embedding site and watermark
detector. Eight DFT coeﬃcients in each 4 × 4 group
are classified into two subgroups, defined as SG1 and
SG2, respectively, as shown in Figure 12.
Embedding





where F(u, v) is the DFT coeﬃcient at frequency (u, v).







where f = √u2 + v2 stands for the frequency at point
(u, v), M is the image size (e.g., 384 or 256), and α,
β are two constants estimated from statistical distri-
bution of all DFT coeﬃcients of video sequence. For
instance, we could derive α = 30 000, β = 1.8 for
video Akiyo. Note that TH plays a very important role
in maintaining the balance between the watermarked
video quality and watermark robustness.
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Figure 13: Comparison between (a) DFT of the original Akiyo image, (b) DFT of the scaled Akiyo image (scaling factor = 0.75), and (c)
DFT of the scaled Akiyo image (scaling factor = 0.5). The DC of the DFT is located in the center of the image. Figures show that only the
low-frequency coeﬃcients and middle-frequency coeﬃcients have little or no change after the image is scaled.
(a) (b)
Figure 14: Area classification in DFT domain. The texture-filled
area is selected to embed the watermark: (a) selected area in our
proposed algorithm and (b) selected area in Barni’s algorithm.









E1− E2> 0, watermark bit=1)
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Iteratively modify E1 and E2 until equation (9) is sat-
isfied. Note that E1 and E2 should be kept as positive
values during iterative calculation:
E1 − E2 >MTH, watermark bit = 1,
E2 − E1 >MTH, watermark bit = 0.
(9)
(h) Based on the newly modified energies E1 and E2, ad-
just themagnitude of every DFT coeﬃcient in SG1 and
SG2 while keeping their phases unchanged. The mod-
ification of each DFT coeﬃcient is with reference to its
original magnitude.
(i) For every watermarked coeﬃcient, its symmetric coef-
ficient with reference to the DC component of DFT
should also be modified to ensure that the water-
marked video pixels have real values.
Figure 15: Surveillance video Dajun.
Postembedding
(j) The watermarked image is generated using IDFT. This
image is rotated back to its original orientation.
(k) Finally, a watermarked VO is extracted again for
MPEG4 encoding.
4.3. Watermark extraction
Watermark extraction is the reverse procedure of watermark
embedding. The received VO is scaled back to its original res-
olution first. Then, similar to the embedding procedure, E1
and E2 for each subgroup are calculated. Finally, the water-




1, E1 − E2 > 0,
0, else.
(10)
4.4. Evaluation of the robustness
of watermarking algorithm
To evaluate the robustness of watermarking algorithm, cor-
rect ratio of the extracted watermark is defined in the follow-
ing equation:
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Figure 16: Correct ratio of extracted watermark under various video processing. All figures show that the correct ratio is larger than 0.85. (a)
Akiyo (scaling factor = 0.5), (b) Bream (scaling factor = 0.5), (c) Akiyo (rotation degree = 30), (d) Bream (rotation degree = 20), (e) Akiyo
(rotation/scaling/MPEG4 coding), (f) Bream (rotation/scaling/MPEG4 coding).
The videos used for evaluation are the same as what
we have used in feature selection evaluation except that
the QCIF video Weather is replaced by a surveillance video
called “Dajun,” shown in Figure 15. During the evaluation,
a content-based 162-bit watermark is used. Some results
of evaluation based on Akiyo and Bream are shown in
Figure 16. From Figure 16, we find that the correct ratio is
bigger than 0.85 if the object is rotated, scaled, or processed
by a combination of rotation, scaling, and MPEG4 coding.
Similar results can also be obtained from evaluation of other
videos. All these results illustrate that the watermarking al-
gorithm is robust enough to ensure that the original mes-
sage for watermark generation can be correctly extracted if
the watermark ECC coding scheme is properly designed.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The objective of this paper is to design an object-based video
authentication system that can protect the integrity of video
(object/background) while allowing various natural video
processing. In our experiment, 300 frames from every video
are used for evaluation. Wemainly evaluate the system in fol-
lowing four aspects:
(a) whether this system is robust to acceptable video pro-
cessing defined in Section 2;
(b) whether this system can detect object replacement;
(c) whether this system can detect background replace-
ment;
(d) whether this system can detect object modification.
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Figure 17: PSNR of watermarked video Akiyo. The dashed line rep-
resents the PSNR of object before and after watermarking with only
watermarking distortion. The solid line represents the PSNR of wa-
termarking system with not only watermarking distortion but also
alignment distortion and interpolation error.
We have developed this system using Visual C++ 6.0. In
this system, the first 18 ART coeﬃcients from total 36 ART
coeﬃcients in MPEG7 shape descriptor are selected as fea-
ture of the object. Among these 18 coeﬃcients, 4 coeﬃcients
are quantized into 5 levels (4 bits), and the other 14 coeﬃ-
cients are quantized into 3 levels (2 bits). The resultant FV is
a 44-bit data (4× 4+2×14 = 44). We employ BCH (63,45,3)
ECC coding scheme, which has 3 bits error correction capa-
bility (this capability is equal to themaximumHamming dis-
tance between the FV obtained from the original object and
the FV obtained from the object undergoing various video
processing), as the feature ECC coding scheme. Eighteen-bit
PCB data of the feature codeword and 30-bit hashed digest
are concatenated to create a 48-bit message. Convolutional
coding (K = 7, rate = 1/3) is used as the watermark ECC
coding scheme. The start and end states are all set to 0. As a
result, the watermark is a 162-bit binary data.
As we mentioned in Section 2, the size of object in video
is chosen as a trigger to start signing and verification in this
system. During evaluation, the system automatically starts
signing or verification if ratio between object and its asso-
ciated image is greater than 15% for a CIF video.
Recall that in watermark embedding procedure, we need
to estimate the orientation of the object before aligning
its mask’s maximum eigenvector with the x-axis in two-
dimensional space. After embedding watermark, the water-
marked object needs to be rotated back to its original lo-
cation. So two PSNR exist to measure the system’s perfor-
mance. One is the PSNR of object before and after water-
marking with only watermarking distortion; the other is the
PSNR between the original object and the watermarked ob-
ject, including watermarking distortion, alignment distor-
tion as well as interpolation error introduced by rotation.
The dashed line in Figure 17 represents the former PSNR,
and the solid line represents the latter PSNR. From Figure 17,
we can find that two PSNR in some frames are equal. This is
(a) (b)
Figure 18: Comparison between (a) the original frame and (b) the
watermarked frame (of Akiyo).
because no alignment is needed in these frames before and
after watermarking since the mask’s maximum eigenvector
of the object is just parallel to the x-axis. This phenomenon
also means that the quality is degraded about 5 dB after the
VO is rotated.
Figure 18 shows the original object and the watermarked
object. The number of frames that are correctly authenti-
cated is shown in Table 4. From the table, we can claim that
the proposed system is robust to acceptable video process-
ing. However, the results obtained from the video sequences
Bream andDajun are not as good as the results acquired from
the video sequences Akiyo and Attacked Akiyo 1, especially in
scaling processing. This is because of relatively small size of
the object in some frames in video sequences Bream and Da-
jun. To embed a 162-bit long watermark, even small object
has to be expanded to a certain size using zero padding. As we
have mentioned previously, this will reduce correct ratio of
watermark detection. Moreover, small object will lose more
information than large object when the object is scaled; this
will also reduce correct ratio of watermark detection. Thus,
compared with other types of video processing, watermark
detection is muchmore sensitive to object size in scaling pro-
cessing. Study of the relationship between the object size and
watermarking will be our future work.
We use video Attacked Akiyo 1 to evaluate whether the
system can detect object replacement. During signing, the
watermark generated from video Akiyo is embedded into the
object of video Attacked Akiyo 1. During verification, the sys-
tem can detect that all the frames are unauthentic. So the pro-
posed system can detect object replacement.
To evaluate the system’s security (i.e., to detect whether
the object and background belong to the same frame or in-
tegrity protection), we combined the object extracted from
the embedded video Akiyo and the background taken from
our laboratory to form a new video sequence called Attacked
Akiyo 2, as shown in Figure 19. The verification results also
show that the system performs well in protecting the integrity
between the object and its associated background.
Finally, we modify the embedded video Akiyo to form a
new video sequence “Attacked Akiyo 3,” shown in Figure 20,
to evaluate whether the system can detect object modifica-
tion. For all the 300 frames in video sequence, 288 frames
are detected as faked frames. But there exists a limitation
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Table 4: System performance when the video object undergoes various video processing (the number of video frames that are correctly
authenticated for a video containing 300 frames).
Video object Resizing (scaling factor is 0.5–1.0) Rotation (0◦–30◦) MPEG4 coding Repadding
Akiyo 300 300 300 300
Bream 261 297 297 300
Dajun 274 293 300 300
Figure 19: The background of the Akiyo has been replaced. This
video is used to evaluate the system’s security (integrity protection).
(Attacked Akiyo 2.)
in this system. As we have mentioned before, any malicious
modifications, which may cause the maximum Hamming
distance between the original VO and modified VO to be less
than the feature ECC error-correcting capability (3 bits in
our system), will be regarded as acceptable video processing.
Therefore, a careful selection of feature and ECC scheme is
the key work in our system.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORKS
In this paper, we have proposed a new object-based video
authentication system, where ART coeﬃcients of the VO are
used as the feature to represent the VO. A content-based wa-
termark was then generated by using ECC schemes and cryp-
tographic hashing to increase the robustness and security of
the system. The watermark was embedded in a set of ran-
domly selected DFT coeﬃcient groups that locate in the low-
middle frequency area. Experimental results further demon-
strated that the proposed video authentication system is ro-
bust duringMPEG4 compression and normal VO processing
such as scaling, rotation, as well as segmentation and mask
errors. The results also showed that this system can protect
the integrity of video (object and background).
In this paper, we assume that we only protect those ob-
jects whose sizes are larger than a preset threshold. This as-
sumption is practical in some applications such as surveil-
lance. Although rigorous evaluation will involve extensive
work in collecting testing videos and especially in generat-
ing attacked videos, we still plan to conduct it in two ways:
one is to fine-tune the parameter setting and perform the
evaluation by real applications; the other is to continue the
theoretic study among watermarking, ECC, and cryptogra-
phy techniques to derive an adaptation framework for robust
and secure content-based authentication.
Figure 20: A flower is put on the embedded object. This is used
to evaluate whether the system can detect object modification. (At-
tacked Akiyo 3.)
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